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NONPUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE PRIMARY
EFFECT TEST UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JOHN

I.

E. MCKEEVERt
INTRODUCTION

T

HE decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning
the establishment clause of the first amendment to the
United States Constitution are inconsistent and contradictory, especially in the area of governmental efforts to aid nonpublic educational institutions or those who attend such institutions. Since
the Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman' the confusion has intensified. As Dean Jesse Choper has stated, "subsequent decisions
2
have produced a conceptual disaster area."
Despite the apparent confusion, some members of the Court
have suggested that the Court has adopted a clear set of principles. 3 While the Court in Lemon did articulate a rubric which it
$ Partner, Litigation Department, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; A.B. 1969, J.D. 1972, University of Pennsylvania. The
author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Maura FJ Whelan in the preparation of this article. However, the conclusions expressed in this article are solely
those of the author.
1. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court invalidated a Rhode Island
statute supplementing the salaries of nonpublic school teachers and a Pennsylvania law authorizing the purchase of "secular educational services" from
nonpublic schools. The Court articulated three tests for determining whether a
statute violates the establishment clause of the first amendment: (1) the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the statute must not foster excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13. Both the Rhode Island
and the Pennsylvania statutes were found to violate the excessive entanglement
prong because of the extensive governmental surveillance necessary to administer the programs. Id. at 614. For a further discussion of Lemon, see infra notes 314 and accompanying text.
2. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools-An Update, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 5, 6 (1987).

3. See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (1985) (Powell,J., concurring)
(stating that Lemon standards "have proved useful" and are "the only coherent

(1079)
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has persistently continued to apply, a clear set of principles
should produce consistent and reasonably predictable results.
However, Lemon has certainly not produced predictability, which
4
is "among the most essential attributes of any legal system."
The Court's conflicting decisions and the bewildering assortment
of multi-opinion cases demonstrate that the tests applied by the
Court fail to produce reasonably consistent results. 5 Consequently, not only are scholars, other commentators, and the general public confused, but so are judges, who must apply the
6
Court's tests.
test a majority of the Court has ever adopted"); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 236 (1977) (Blackmun, J., writing for the Court) ("the Court's numerous
precedents ... now provide substantial guidance"); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 (1973) (Powell,J., writing for the
Court) ("the controlling constitutional standards have become firmly rooted and
the broad contours of our inquiry are now well defined"). Curiously, in Nyquist,
former ChiefJustice Burger also claimed to find a clear principle in the Court's
prior decisions when he stated, "While there is no straight line running through
our decisions .... our cases do, it seems to me, lay down one solid, basic principle .... ." Id. at 799 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, he reached the opposite result from that of Mr. Justice Powell in that
case. The lesson is clear: either there is no clear principle, or there are at least
two sets of principles which are diametrically opposed to each other.
4. Lines, The Entanglement Prong of the Establishment Clause and the Needy Child
in the Private School Is DistributiveJustice Possible?, 17 J.L. & EDUc. 1, 3 (1988).
5. Dean Choper aptly describes the situation thus:
The Court has held, on the one hand, that government can finance
the bus transportation of children to parochial schools but, on the
other hand, that government cannot finance the bus transportation for
field trips from these parochial schools to cultural and scientific centers,
such as museums. This is an extremely difficult distinction to maintain.
The Court has held, on the one hand, that the state can lend state approved secular textbooks to students who attend parochial schools but,
on the other hand, that the state cannot lend instructional materials
(such as maps, films, movie projectors, or laboratory equipment) either
to the students or to the schools. What makes a textbook less religious
than a map is something that I have yet to discern. Perhaps time will
demonstrate the wisdom of the distinction.
On the question of "auxiliary services," such as remedial courses
or guidance counseling, the Court has held, on the one hand, that if a
public school teacher enters the parochial school to provide such services, that violates the establishment clause but, on the other hand, if
these same services are offered by these same teachers to these same
parochial school students outside of the parochial school, it is valideven if the services are provided in a mobile unit that is parked right at
the curb of the parochial school. This is an interesting geographic distinction, but difficult to justify as having constitutional significance.
Choper, supra note 2, at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
6. See, e.g., ACLU v. Allegheny County, 842 F.2d 655, 663 (3d Cir. 1988)
(Weis,J., dissenting) ("The jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause... ranks
high in confusion, inconsistency and emotional fervor."), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 109 S. Ct. 3089 (1989).
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When a well-developed body of case law leads to such confusion among judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, not to mention
the general public, the confusion is usually the result of unclear
thinking by the decision maker. The implication is that either the
principles are not very clear, or they are not very good principles.
Yet, despite the crescendo of criticism not only from commentators but also from an increasing number of members of the Court
itself,7 the three-part test enunciated in Lemon continues to
8
survive.
This article suggests that the Lemon analysis continues to survive primarily because two of its elements-the "secular purpose"
test and the "primary effect" test-appear to reflect, at least to
some extent, the purpose underlying the establishment clause, 9
which is the prevention of governmental action that threatens
7. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 422 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265-66
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
stated, in dissent, that he would abandon the "three-part test" first announced
in Lemon because " '[c]orrosive precedents' have left us without firm principles
on which to decide these cases." Id. (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White, who dissented in Lemon, has "long disagreed with the
Court's interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause in the context of state aid to private schools." Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, now Chief Justice,
despite his apparent adherence to the Lemon formulation in his earlier dissents
concerning the application of the Lemon test, see, e.g.,
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 387-96 (1975), joined the ranks of its critics in his dissent in Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-12 (1985) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). The Court's newest member, Justice Kennedy, has also signalled dissatisfaction with the Lemon
formulation in his concurring opinion in Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S.Ct. 2562,
2582 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Finally, even Justice Powell exhibited
some ambivalence in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262-63 (1977) (Powell,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. It has been suggested that the Lemon standards persist because of the lack
of any alternatives that are acceptable to the Court. See, e.g., Beschle, The Conservative as Liberalb The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach ofJustice
O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151 (1987). This is surprising in light of the
many alternatives proposed by scholars. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673 (1980); Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); Marshall, "We Know It When We See It ":The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S.CAL.
L. REV. 495 (1986); Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and DoctrinalIllusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987); Note, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need to Reform Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH. U.L.
REV. 573 (1986); Note, PoliticalEntanglement as an Independent Test of Constitutionality Under the Establishment Clause, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1209 (1984). Thus far,
however, none of these alternatives has been accepted by the Court.
9. The third element of the Lemon analysis-the so-called "excessive entanglement" test-also reflects an underlying constitutional principle embodied in
the religion clauses of the first amendment. But it has been improperly used in
establishment clause cases when the concerns it reflects are more properly dealt
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religious freedom by endorsing or favoring one set of beliefs concerning religion over others.' 0 The problem may not be with the
two tests themselves, but may instead be with the manner in
which the Court applies them. As a result, the need may not be so
much for a complete rethinking of Lemon or for a totally new analysis, but rather for a modification of the way in which its tests are
applied.
After briefly discussing some of the problems with the
Court's present approach, I will propose a modification of the primary effect test. Although the proposed change in establishment
clause doctrine may not, on the surface, appear to be significant,
there are major implications for cases dealing with governmental
aid to nonpublic education.
II.

THE LEMON ANALYSIS:

"HEADS I WIN, TAILS

You LoSE"

In Lemon the Court, in an opinion written by former Chief
Justice Burger, invalidated a Rhode Island statute which provided
governmental subsidies for teachers' salaries and a Pennsylvania
statute which reimbursed nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and other instructional materials used in specified secular subjects.' I The majority attempted to crystallize the holdwith in cases arising under the free exercise clause. See infra notes 67-73 and
accompanying text.
10. I use the phrase "set of beliefs concerning religion" because, for purposes of the establishment clause, the term "religion" includes "nonreligion,"
and even "irreligion" or "anti-religion." The constitutional provision that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," U.S.
CONST. amend. I, is meant to prohibit any governmental support of particular
beliefs in the area of religion. As former ChiefJustice Burger has pointed out, the
first amendment's authors "did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state
church or a state religion .... Instead they commanded that there should be 'no
law respecting an establishment of religion.' " Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. I) (emphasis supplied by Court). The breadth of the term
"respecting... religion" makes it synonymous with the term "beliefs concerning
religion." Thus, since atheism is a belief concerning religion, it falls within the
protection and the prohibition of the establishment clause. In other words, the
establishment clause is meant not only to prohibit government from discriminating in favor of or against certain religious beliefs by aiding some religious sects
at the expense of others, but it is also meant to prohibit government from compelling nonbelievers to adopt or support religious beliefs, or vice versa. See, e.g.,
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60 ("The addition of 'or voluntary prayer' indicates that the
State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent with the established principle that the government must
pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion."); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) ("A proper
respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the
State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion.").
II. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-14. The Pennsylvania statute provided for payments directly to the nonpublic educational institution, whereas the Rhode Is-
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ings of its prior cases on aid to nonpublic schools into three tests.
Chief Justice Burger articulated the tests as follows: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; . ..finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' ",12
The first test-the secular purpose test-has not generated
any appreciable controversy. The Court has always found that
statutes providing aid to nonpublic education had a valid secular
purpose.13 However, the Court has repeatedly invoked either the
primary effect test or the excessive entanglement test, or both, to
strike down virtually every aid program it has examined since
Lemon.14
Both commentators and the Court itself have recognized that
the simultaneous application of the primary effect test and the excessive entanglement test poses an apparently insoluble dilemma
for government in achieving a constitutionally permissible purpose. 15 As those tests have been applied by the Court, where aid
land statute provided for salary supplements which were paid directly to
teachers who applied for them. Id. at 606-10. The majority found no significance in the distinction between payments made to the institution as opposed to
those which do not flow through the institution but which instead go directly to
the individuals involved. But see, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-87 (1986) (Marshall, J., writing for the Court) (aid
program that provides money directly to persons for educational purposes is
constitutional even though recipient uses aid to enroll in bible college).
12. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
13. See, e.g., id. at 613 (no basis for conclusion that legislative intent was to
advance religion when statutes clearly state that they are intended to enhance
quality of secular education in all schools). The same is not true in establishment clause cases dealing with prayer in public schools. See Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (statute which authorized period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" had no secular purpose and was thus unconstitutional). Although the Court has not invalidated school aid programs because of
a lack of a secular purpose, certain opinions of individual Justices have a tone
which suggests that the author suspected the existence of an improper purpose.
See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting)
(Commenting on New York law upheld by majority which authorized loan of
textbooks to parochial school students, Justice Black stated that "powerful sectarian religious propagandists ...have succeeded in securing passage of the
present law to help religious schools carry on their sectarian religious
purposes.").
14. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 396 (1985)
(Court invalidated two after school hours, government-financed enrichment
programs conducted on parochial school premises because aid would have "primary effect of providing a direct and substantial advancement of [a] sectarian
enterprise").
15. See, e.g.,
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 418, 420-21 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring, and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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is made available to schools which also have a religious mission, it
does not seem possible to avoid violating the primary effect test
without creating a monitoring system designed to avoid the prohibited effect. 16 When government has not monitored the uses to
which governmental aid is phtt by the religiously affiliated school,
the Court has held that it cannot uphold the constitutionality of
the particular program because there is insufficient assurance that
a constitutionally impermissible effect will be avoided.'! Yet, the
required monitoring system makes it impossible to avoid excessive entanglement between government and the religiously affiliated schools. Consequently, it seems that there cannot possibly
be a constitutional method for achieving the concededly proper
purposes which underlie governmental aid to nonpublic
education.
Moreover, it is not only the simultaneous application of both
tests which creates the seemingly incongruous result of government not being able to find a feasible way to further constitutionally permissible purposes. 8 Even when considered alone, the
Court's application of the primary effect test is defective.
A.

The Arbitrariness, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty of the Primary Effect
Test as Applied by the Court

The second prong of the Lemon formulation requires that the
"principal or primary" effect of a statute must not be to advance
or inhibit religion.19 This formulation might suggest that the
Court engages in some sort of balancing process, in which the
various effects of a statute are compared in order to determine
the "primary" or "principal" effect of the statute. If that were the
16. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (surveillance necessary
to assure that professional public school staff members who provide auxiliary
services to nonpublic schools such as counseling and testing do not advance
religious mission of church-related schools in which they serve); Lemon, 403 U.S.
602 (continuous state surveillance and inspection of school records were necessary to ensure that statutory restrictions were obeyed).
17. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 774 (1973) (Court noted that grants were given largely without restriction
on usage and no attempt was made to restrict payments to those expenditures
related to upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes).
18. Of course, even though the tests produce the anomalous result of making it impossible to achieve a concededly constitutional purpose, it may be that
there are no alternative tests which will effectuate the establishment clause and
protect the values which it embodies. If that is the case, then we will just have to
accept the present approach. However, it is difficult to accept the notion that
there is no constitutionally permissible method for achieving a constitutionally
permissible purpose.
19. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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case, a statute could have the effect of advancing religion but nevertheless be constitutional because it might advance secular interests to an even greater extent. In other words, the "primary" or
"principal" effect might be a permissible secular one, with the result that any "secondary" effect which benefits or inhibits religion
would not invalidate the statute.
Nevertheless, that is neither what the Court purports to do,
nor what the Court actually does in practice. 20 The Court's decisions do not attempt in any way to measure or evaluate and then
compare the different effects of a statute to determine whether
the "secular" effects outweigh, or are "primary" with respect to,
any effect which the statute may have in promoting or inhibiting
religion. Rather, the test is applied so as to invalidate a statute
whenever, in the Court's view, a significant effet of the statute is
to advance religion, regardless of the relative significance of the
secular effects of the statute.21
However, the Court's failure to engage in a balancing approach is not the fundamental problem with its application of the
primary effect test. Indeed, the use of a balancing approach
might only further confuse the situation. It is difficult enough for
the members of the Court to agree on where to draw the line in
searching for the effects of a statute which makes aid available to
nonpublic schools or their students. A balancing process would
only create additional room for differences of opinion among the
members of the Court concerning which particular effects of a
statute are predominant.
Instead, the basic problem is that the Court has no objective
standard or principle for determining the effects of a particular
statute. 2 2 The Court has not developed any principled way of de20. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 503 n.47 ("The Court decisions cannot be
explained as the result of a balancing of interests, since the Court does not employ a balancing test in its establishment jurisprudence.").
21. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (Court
invalidated two after school hours government-financed enrichment programs
for adults and children conducted on parochial school grounds because primary
effect of aid would be to advance religion); see also Lines, supra note 4, at 24
(noting that Court allows legislation to stand in other areas such as racial discrimination, free speech, and free exercise of religion if there is a second valid
purpose that outweighs discriminatory purpose, but does not apply this analysis
in establishment clause cases).
22. Justice Kennedy may have sensed that the difficulty with the Court's
establishment clause approach under Lemon lies in the Court's attempt to determine effects in a vacuum, with the result that, in many cases, the Court bases its
decisions on hypothetical or theoretical possibilities rather than on an evidentiary record which assesses the actual effects of the statute. He suggests that an
establishment clause challenge based on the primary effect test is not a challenge
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termining how the search for the effects of a statute should be
conducted and where it should end. As a result, the Court has
often relied on extremely attenuated "effects" in holding that an
23
aid program is unconstitutional.
Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that application of
the primary effect test will lead to arbitrary results and uncertainty from case to case. As the Court's decisions demonstrate,
one Justice's "effect" is another Justice's "non-effect." It is not
difficult to find instances where one Justice vehemently insists
that a particular statute is unconstitutional because it has the effect of advancing religion, while another Justice in the same case
vehemently insists that the statute is constitutional because it
24
does not have the forbidden effect of advancing religion.
to the statute on its face but rather is an "as applied" challenge, which requires
the development of a factual record. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562,
2582 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This suggestion may be an effort to
grapple with the Court's reliance on hypothesized or possible effects.
Justice Kennedy is correct in noting that too often the Court relies on assumed or "soft" facts rather than on facts developed on an evidentiary record.
But again, that is only part of the problem.
An "as applied" challenge assumes that the statute itself is valid and asserts
that those who administer the statute are doing so in a constitutionally improper
way. On the other hand, a claim of facial invalidity looks primarily at the statute
itself rather than at its actual implementation. An attack on the facial validity of
a statute based on an allegedly unconstitutional effect and an attack on the statute as applied both require the development of an evidentiary record, but the
types of facts relevant to each analysis are different. A facial attack based on an
improper effect looks for facts which show what results when the statute is properly applied according to its strict terms. However, in an "as applied" challenge,
the inquiry is how the statute is actually implemented by those charged with the
task of doing so.
The distinction may appear at first blush to be merely semantics. However,
the consequences of finding a constitutional violation differ markedly in the two
situations. In a case of facial invalidity the statute does not survive and may no
longer have any effect, whereas in an "as applied" situation, the statute itself
survives and may still be given effect by being implemented in a constitutionally
proper way.
To say that a statute is facially valid and that the challenge is therefore to
the statute "as applied" is a helpful distinction which keeps the Court's inquiry
from improperly relying on speculation concerning possible effects rather than
on actual facts. But it still does not answer the question where the line should be
drawn in searching out the actual effects of the statute for purposes of determining whether the statute itself-as opposed to how it is applied-is constitutional.
23. See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. 373 (aid to after school hours secular
enrichment courses conducted on parochial school grounds is unconstitutional
since primary effect would be to advance religion); see also Lines, supra note 4, at
13 (noting that Court relies on possible effects, not proven effects).
24. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396-402, 414 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., writing for the Court, and Marshall, J., dissenting); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80, 804-05 (1973) (Powell, J., writing for the Court, and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Any effort to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect" effects, or between "incidental" and "nonincidental" effects has the
same inherent defect as the current approach or as a balancing
approach-one person's "incidental" or "indirect" effect is another person's "primary" or "direct" effect. The terms "primary," "direct," "indirect," and "incidental" are merely labels
which describe a conclusion rather than substantive tests used to
arrive at the conclusion.
This makes it almost impossible to predict the result of a future case from past cases. For example, in Everson v. Board of Education,25 the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Black, upheld
a state statute which reimbursed parents for bus fares paid for the
transportation to and from school, by public carriers, of children
attending nonpublic as well as public schools. One might assume
from Everson that it would likewise be constitutional for a state to
pay for bus transportation for field trips from parochial schools to
nonreligious public scientific or cultural museums or events. Yet,
in Wolman v. Walter,26 the Court held that the government may not
reimburse parochial schools for the cost of bus transportation for
field trips to cultural and scientific institutions because to do so
would have the effect of advancing religion.2 7 Why the prohibited
effect was found in the case of the bus transportation at issue in
Wolman but not in Everson is mystifying.
One might argue that the Court upheld the statute in Everson
because there the aid was also available to students who attended
public schools. 28 But if the test is whether the statute has the effect of advancing religion, the fact that the statute makes the same
aid equally available to public school students as well as to parochial school students is irrelevant. Making the aid available to
students who attend the religiously affiliated schools still has the
effect of advancing the mission of those schools, regardless of
whether it is also available to public school students. Making the
aid available to public school students as well as to parochial
25. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
27. Id. at 253-54. The Court reasoned that "field trips are an integral part
of the educational experience, and where the teacher works within and for a
sectarian institution, an unacceptable risk of fostering religion is an inevitable
by-product." Id.
28. Whether this distinguishes Everson from Wolman is questionable. The
statute in Wolman authorized Ohio to "provide such field trip transportation and
services to nonpublic school students as areprovided to public school students ...."
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(L) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added), quoted in
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252.
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school students may lead to permissible secular effects in addition
to the effect of advancing the mission of the religiously affiliated
nonpublic schools, but it does not eliminate the latter effect of the
aid-making it easier or less expensive to attend religiously affiliated schools.
One might also argue that in such an instance advancing religion is not the primary effect of the statute. But the distinction
between "primary" effects and "nonprimary" effects is just as elusive as that between "direct" and "indirect" effects. 29 Moreover,
it is not clear that a statute which makes aid available equally to
public as well as to parochial school students can be so easily distinguished, on a "primary effect" basis, from a statute which provides aid only to nonpublic school students. Since all school-age
students must attend some school, a statute which aids public as
well as parochial school students does not promote public school
attendance, whereas it may arguably assist students in choosing to
attend religiously affiliated schools by making it easier or cheaper
to do so.
Furthermore, the Court invalidated the statute at issue in
Wolman because there was a danger that religious instruction
might be given in connection with the field trips to museums. 30
Assuming this is true and assuming that it leads to the prohibited
effect of advancing religion, it seems even more clear that the
statute at issue in Everson would also have the prohibited effect
since that statute provided transportation to the nonpublic school
itself, where religious instruction would unquestionably be given.
Of course, Everson was decided long before Lemon. The
Court, however, has recently indicated that it is not prepared to
abandon Everson.31 In any event, Justice Black's opinion for the
Court in Everson and Justice Rutledge's dissent, which was joined
in by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, focused on what
they perceived to be the effect of the statute at issue but differed
32
in their assessments.
29. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 253 (since nonpublic schools control trips, unacceptable risk of fostering religion exists).
31. For recent cases citing Everson with approval, see County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100 (1989); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S.
Ct. 890, 896 (1989); Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2574 (1988).
32. Justice Black, writing for the majority, found that the legislation "does
not support" religious schools but instead "does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion,
safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." Everson, 330 U.S. at
18. On the other hand, Justice Rutledge argued in dissent that "[t]he funds
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The loan of textbooks and other educational equipment provides another example of the arbitrariness of the Court's unguided search for a prohibited effect. In Board of Education v.
Allen, 3 3 the Court held that the loan of approved textbooks dealing with secular subjects is constitutional. Implicitly then, the
Court has determined that the loan of such textbooks does not
have the primary effect of advancing religion, although the textbooks may be loaned to students attending religiously affiliated
schools. Indeed, the Court in Lemon cited Allen as support for its
endorsement of the primary effect test. 34 However, the Court has
invalidated the loan of instructional materials and equipment
such as nonreligious periodicals, maps, and laboratory equipment
on the ground that the loan of such materials does have the primary effect of advancing the mission of religiously affiliated
schools. 35 Why secular maps or laboratory equipment advance
religion while secular textbooks do not is unexplainable.
The Court's application of the primary effect test could also
result in the very same statute being constitutional in one state
but not in another. Suppose, for example, that a state such as
Maine, which has a number of private schools but very few religiously affiliated schools, enacts a statute which provides aid to
nonpublic schools. 36 Under the primary effect test as currently
applied by the Court, that statute would presumably pass constitutional muster since most of the aid recipients would not be religiously affiliated schools or students who attend such schools.
However, the very same statute would be unconstitutional if enused here were raised by taxation" and that "their use does in fact give aid and
encouragement to religious instruction." Everson, 330 U.S. at 45 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). See also id. at 52-53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
33. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The statute in question required local public
schools to lend textbooks free of charge to public and private school students in
grades seven through twelve. The Court stated that the law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free
of charge and that the financial benefit is given to parents and children, not the
schools. Even though this seemingly makes it more likely that a child will choose
to attend a sectarian school, the Court noted that this factor alone does not
demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious institution.
Id. at 243-44.
34. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
35. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 357, 364-66 (1975) (loan of instructional materials and equipment advanced religion since these items could be
diverted to religious purposes and because benefit accrued to schools of
predominantly religious character).
36. A 1988 survey of 100 private schools in Maine indicated that only 23 of
the 93 reporting private schools were religiously affiliated. Telephone interview
with Mr. Alton Sutherland, Office of the Commissioner of Education for the
State of Maine (1988).
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acted in a state like Pennsylvania, where the vast majority of nonpublic school students attend religiously affiliated schools.
Similarly, the Court's approach could result in a statute being
constitutional at one time but becoming unconstitutional at a
later time, or vice versa. For example, suppose parish churches
or local synagogues in Maine decided to take advantage of the
opportunity provided by the Maine legislation and established
their own schools. The previously constitutional statute could
then become unconstitutional once a significant number of such
schools were established and began receiving aid under the statute. Thus, under the Court's approach, a state legislature can
never be sure that a statute enacted and upheld as constitutional
will remain constitutional.
On the other hand, suppose that, as a result of the lack of
governmental aid, most religiously affiliated schools in Pennsylvania were ultimately forced to close, so that only those private
schools which were not religiously affiliated remained open.
Under these circumstances, a previously unconstitutional statute
could become constitutional. 3 7 This results because, under the
Court's approach, the prohibited effect exists, and an aid program
is therefore unconstitutional, whenever the program is disproportionately taken advantage of by a particular religious sect or its
members, or by religiously affiliated institutions in general.
The Court has grappled in another context with the question
whether disproportionate impact alone is sufficient for a finding
of unconstitutionality. In the case of claims of unconstitutional
racial discrimination, the Court has explicitly rejected the argument that a racially disproportionate effect alone is sufficient to
invalidate a statute "neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue." 38 Instead, the
Court has held:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends
37. In South Carolina,just under 27,000 students attended denominational
schools in 1988, and approximately 18,000 students attended nondenominational private schools. SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF EDUC., 1987-1988 ANNUAL REPORT. Any significant reduction in the enrollment of the denominational schools
could bring the enrollment of denominational schools roughly in balance with
that of nondenominational private schools and thereby possibly change the constitutional calculus in favor of a statute that would otherwise be unconstitutional.
38. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Davis involved a class
action suit by black applicants seeking employment as police officers who
claimed that recruiting procedures, particularly a written test, were racially discriminatory. The Court held that a law is not unconstitutional solely because it
has a racially disproportionate impact. Id.
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is nevertheless invalid... if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching
and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes .... 39
However, in striking down statutes providing aid to nonpublic schools, the Court has repeatedly cited and relied exclusively
on statistics showing that the majority of the beneficiaries of an
40
aid program were religiously affiliated schools or their students.
This fosters the impression that the Court is hostile toward religion, or at least toward those religious sects which take advantage
of the aid program. A statute which has the effect of conveying
the impression, as an official policy, of governmental hostility toward religion offends the prohibition that Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of certain beliefs concerning
religion.
The primary effect test as presently applied clearly leads to
arbitrary results as well as a great deal of ambiguity, uncertainty
and instability in the law. This is contrary to sound constitutional
adjudication. Just as the Court is always ready to invalidate arbitrary action by the states as well as by the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government, so too it should also adhere
to principles which avoid arbitrary results in its own decisions. If
a particular analysis has demonstrated a history of producing arbitrary results, then the Court should either reject or modify that
analysis.
B.

A Suggested Modification of the Primary Effect Test

Given a prior finding of a valid legislative purpose, one might
legitimately ask why the Court does not end its inquiry there. If
thepurpose which the legislature seeks to effectuate is constitutionally permissible, what possible reason could there be for not permitting the legislature to adopt a program which achieves that
39. Id. at 248.
40. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975) ("of the 1,320 nonpublic schools in Pennsylvania . . . [that] qualify for aid under Act 195, more than
75% are church-related or religiously affiliated educational institutions"); Sloan
v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973) (90% of the children attending nonpublic
schools in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are enrolled in schools that are
controlled by religious organizations); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 608-10 (in Rhode Island, 95% of nonpublic elementary school pupils attended schools affiliated
with the Roman Catholic Church, while in Pennsylvania 96% of students in nonpublic schools receiving state aid attended church-related schools).
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purpose? This assumes, of course, that there is at least some rational relationship between the constitutionally permissible pur4
pose and the method chosen to achieve that purpose. '
One sometimes gets the impression when reading some of
the Justices' opinions in the aid to nonpublic education area that
the Justices really suspect that the legislative purpose is not what
it is purported to be. 4 2 Thus far, however, a majority of the Court
has almost always been unwilling to say so.
In a system built on the concept of separation of powers and
resulting checks and balances, there is nothing wrong with this
skepticism. The best way to keep this skepticism within proper
bounds is to recognize it openly and test the legitimacy of the
stated legislative purpose by insisting on a rational relationship
between that purpose and the provisions of the statute in question. After all, putting aside procedural protections explicitly set
forth in the Constitution, such as the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the purpose of constitutional provisions delineating limits on legislative and other governmental
powers is to confine the exercise of those powers to legitimate
purposes, not to insure that the best, most efficient, or optimum
method of implementation is chosen.
Nevertheless, the Court has gone beyond a pure purpose
test, presumably in order to make sure that a constitutionally permissible purpose is not achieved in a manner which unwittingly
undermines the constitutional values at stake. An effects test is
one way of making sure that a well-intentioned legislature does
not inadvertently infringe upon basic constitutional rights or values. In short, an effects test may arguably play a legitimate role in
safeguarding constitutionally protected values. That is undoubtedly why the primary effect test has survived for many years, despite a great deal of criticism.
Moreover, given the history of establishment clause jurisprudence to date, it may be difficult for a stable majority of the Court
to accept a situation in which the Court would blind itself to the
41. Again, the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis is instructive. In Davis, the Court held that "a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise
within the power of government to pursue," is constitutional even in the face of
a claim that it has a racially disproportionate effect. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242; see
also id. at 246 (governmental action is constitutional where it "is neutral on its
face and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally empowered to pursue.").
42. See Mueller v. Allen, 463.U.S. 388, 408-09 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("The statute is little more than a subsidy of tuition masquerading as a
subsidy of general educational expenses."); see also supra note 13.
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effects of a particular statute, as long as the purpose of the legislation is proper. The key to an effective reformulation of doctrine
in this area, then, must focus on protecting the constitutional
value at stake while at the same time avoiding the arbitrariness
exhibited by the Court's current "forbidden fruit" approach.
In its decisions to date, the Court has applied the secular purpose test and the primary effect test independently. The Court
first determines whether the particular statute in question has a
valid secular purpose. Once it makes that determination, it then
looks beyond the purpose of the statute and attempts to determine whether the "principal or primary effect [is] one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."' 4 3 If the "forbidden fruit" is
found to exist, the statute is invalidated despite the propriety of
the legislative purpose.
As previously indicated, this contrasts sharply with the
Court's approach to cases concerning allegedly unconstitutional
racial discrimination under the fifth and the fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 44 In Washington v. Davis,4 5 the Court
specifically declined to divorce its analysis of the potential or actual discriminatory effect of governmental action from its analysis
of the purpose of the governmental action in question. The
Court stated: "Our cases have not embraced the proposition that
a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because
46
it has a racially disproportionate impact."
I have already noted that when the Court finds that an aid
program for nonpublic schools has a constitutionally permissible
purpose but nevertheless invalidates the program solely because
it happens to benefit only a certain segment of society, it creates
43. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
44. See Lines, supra note 4, at 23-24 (noting that under free exercise, free
speech, and equal protection clauses, test is intent alone). As previously indicated, the purpose of the establishment clause is not merely to prevent discrimination between or among different religious sects. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text. "Nonreligion" and "irreligion" may also be protected by
the establishment clause. However, as long as it is agreed that the injunction
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"
means that Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of any beliefs concerning religion, then the establishment clause should properly be analyzed as a prohibition against discrimination on account of one's beliefs with
respect to religion, including, for example, a belief in atheism.
45. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
46. Id. at 239; see also id. at 242 ("[W]e have not held that a law .... is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.").
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the perception that it is hostile toward the group which takes advantage of the benefits provided by the statute.4 7 Thus, one finds
in the dissenting opinions of many cases the arguments that: (1)
the Court's decision discriminates against religion; 48 (2) such an
approach is not required by the establishment clause; 49 and (3)
50
the Court's decision is itself contrary to the free exercise clause.
When the Court applies the primary effect test, it often does
not examine the terms of the statute. Instead, it looks only at the
identity of those who take advantage of the aid program in question. As long as a significant number of beneficiaries are religiously affiliated schools, the forbidden fruit is said to exist and the
statute is invalidated. It makes no difference whether there is an
inherent or necessary causal nexus between the specific terms of
the particular statute and the perceived "effect." The fundamental problem with the Court's approach is that the Court has applied its primary effect test without requiring some necessary
causal linkage between the specific terms of the statute and the
5
supposed "primary effect" of advancing religion. '
In other words, the source of the arbitrariness in the Court's
decisions is that, in determining the effects of an aid statute, the
Court relies on "accidental" facts-facts which are more the re47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See also Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985) (overwhelming number of private schools participating in aid
program were religiously affiliated); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985) (same). This perception fosters the notion that there is an inevitable
tension between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, a position
with which I disagree. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
48. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 84 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In the former Chief Justice's view, to suggest that a moment-of-silence statute
that includes the word "prayer" unconstitutionally endorses religion while one
that simply provides for a moment of silence does not, manifests not neutrality,
but hostility toward religion. Id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
49. See Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 400 (White, J., dissenting) ("I have long
disagreed with the Court's interpretation and application of the establishment
clause in the context of state aid to private schools ....
[T]he Court's ...
decisions are 'not required by the First Amendment and are contrary to the
long-range interests of the country.' ") (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)).
50. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
51. If the statisticians of the world will forgive me, the concept of a "spurious correlation" may perhaps be used as a rough analogy. Two facts may be
correlated with each other even though one is not the cause of the other. In
such instances, it is incorrect to say that one is the "cause" and the other, therefore, is the "effect." In order to arrive at that conclusion, one must not only
look to see if the two happen to coexist with each other; one must also be able to
establish a rational and inherent causal nexus under which one fact "causes" the
other fact to result.
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suit of historical accident rather than necessary results of the statute in question-in assessing whether a scheme of governmental
aid to nonpublic schools or their students undermines the establishment clause. Under the Court's analysis, there need not be an
inherent causal relationship between the specific terms of the particular statute and the allegedly prohibited "effect." The Court
never asks whether the prohibited "effect" is caused by the statute itself, or whether it is the incidental result of factors unrelated
to the terms of the statute.
This failure to require an inherent causal connection or
nexus between the terms of the statute and the fact that those
who choose to take advantage of the aid provided by the statute
happen to be primarily religious sects give rise to the perception
that the Court is hostile toward religion. Such an approach is not
consistent with the religion clauses. 52 In fact, once it is agreed
that the establishment clause protects "nonreligion" as well as
religion, one must conclude that the establishment clause protects both religion and nonreligion equally. As a result, it is contrary to the establishment clause (as well as to the free exercise
clause) to prevent or prohibit adherents of religious sects from
seeking the benefits offered under a facially neutral statute which
has a constitutionally proper purpose.
Once the source of the arbitrariness in the Court's decisions
is identified, the solution is straightforward. A governmental program providing aid to nonpublic education-whether the aid be
given directly to the institution, or to its students or their parents-is unconstitutional only where the terms of the statute inherently or necessarily have the effect of promoting one set of
beliefs concerning religion over others (including atheism).
There must be some logical and necessary causal nexus between
the specific terms of the statute and the advancement of certain
beliefs concerning religion. The causal relationship must be inherent in the terms of the statute itself. If there is no such inherent nexus, then it cannot be said that the statute is the cause of a
prohibited effect.
This means that any statute which happens to result in aid
being made available to a religious institution is not necessarily
unconstitutional by virtue of that fact alone. If the aid in question
is equally available to adherents of other religious groups or to
52. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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those who have no religious beliefs at all, then the statute cannot be
said to produce the prohibited effect of advancing religion.
Some of the Court's decisions hint at the concept of an inher-'
ent causal nexus between the specific terms of an aid statute and
the advancement of a particular set of religious beliefs. For example, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,5 3 the
Court held that it was not unconstitutional for the state to "finance petitioner's training at a Christian college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director." 5 4 Witters involved a vocational
rehabilitation program for the blind which provided aid to a blind
student even though the student was attending "a private Christian college ... and studying bible, ethics, speech and church administration in order to equip himself for a career as a pastor,
missionary, or youth director." 5 5 Writing for the Court, Justice
Marshall stated, "the mere circumstance that petitioner has chosen
to use neutrally availablestate aid to help pay for his religious education [does not] confer any message of state endorsement of religion." 56 Although Justice Marshall did not say so directly,
implicit in his statement is the recognition that there was nothing
in the terms of the aid statute itself which would necessarily cause
the advancement of religion. As a result, granting aid to the blind
student involved in Witters was not unconstitutional merely because he chose to use the aid to further his religious studies.
This same reasoning could equally be used to uphold most of
the aid programs which the Court has invalidated. However,
since the Court has never explicitly incorporated an inherent
causal nexus requirement into the Lemon analysis, the Court has
usually not looked for this connection in reaching its decisions.
This accounts in large part not only for the inconsistencies among
the Court's decisions, but also for the disagreements among Justices in particular cases on the question whether a particular statute has the prohibited effect. 57 One Justice implicitly insists on
the existence of a causal connection inherent in the terms of the
statute itself, while other Justices do not and instead focus on the
mere fact that only certain groups actually take advantage of aid
that is freely available to all groups without regard to religious
affiliation.
53. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
54. Id. at 489.
55. Id. at 483.
56. Id. at 488-89 (emphasis added) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
57. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Requiring that a statute have an inherent tendency, by its
terms, to advance religion would validate most governmental aid
programs for nonpublic education previously struck down by the
Court. In virtually every case considered by the Court, there has
been nothing in the terms of the particular statutes which would
inevitably advance religion by making aid-or more aid-available to groups holding one set of beliefs concerning religion as
opposed to other groups with different beliefs. Instead, the "effects" which have led the Court to invalidate statutes under Lemon
were merely "accidental" effects.
On the other hand, the "inherent nexus" test proposed here
would have resulted in the invalidation of at least one program
which has been upheld by the Court. In Zorach v. Clauson,58 the
Court upheld a "dismissed-time" statute under which students
were released from public schools early in order to receive religious instruction at their religious institutions. The Court distinguished this situation from the "released-time" program struck
down in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education59 on the
ground that the religious instruction in McCollum was provided on
public school premises. 60 However, as one commentator has
stated, this fact "had nothing to do with the rationale of McCollum;
in each case, students were detained without purpose unless they
went to church." 6 1 Under the "inherent nexus" test, however,
both programs would be unconstitutional since inherent in the
62
very terms of both statutes is the effect of advancing religion.
Likewise, the "inherent nexus" test might invalidate an aid
program which would cover the cost of all textbooks used by nonpublic schools, since it necessarily follows from the terms of such
a statute that the state would subsidize the cost of religious textbooks used in religiously affiliated schools and would thereby
support and advance particular sets of beliefs concerning religion. This inherent nexus between the terms of the statute and
58. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
59. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
60. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315.
61. Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
409, 422 (1986).
62. One might argue that Zorach is not a good example of a situation where
the "inherent nexus" test invalidates a program upheld by the Court because
the statute in Zorach, a pre-Lemon case, might not be upheld under the Lemon test.
Yet, the Court has not indicated that it would overrule Zorach and has attempted
to distinguish it in recent cases. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 390-91 (1985); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73 n.2 (1985) (O'Connor,J,
concurring).
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the support or advancement of particular beliefs concerning religion disappears, however, if the statute's terms authorize reimbursement only for the cost of textbooks on secular subjects
which are also available to and approved for use in public schools.
Thus, the Court's decision approving such programs was cor63
rectly decided.
The proposed "inherent nexus" requirement is not such a
radical departure from existing doctrine. Other alternative approaches which have been proposed seem to be groping for this
same concept. For example, the neutrality principle suggested by
Professor Philip Kurland is in many ways similar, in that it too is
an attempt to bring the Court's analysis back to the terms of the
particular statute rather than concentrating on facts which are
more the result of circumstance or historical accident. 64
However, the neutrality approach has its own deficiencies. 6 5
First, it apparently requires only that the statute not single out
religion or any particular religious sect for favorable or unfavorable treatment. As a result, the test is unduly restricted to an analysis only of the statute's terms, without any attempt to determine
the actual effects of the statute in operation. In contrast, the "inherent nexus" test requires an analysis of the terms of the statute,
of its actual effects in the real world, and of the nature of the link
between the two. Rather than putting the emphasis on either the
terms of the statute or on its effects, both parts of the analysis are
equally necessary and important, and the two must be related to
each other.
Similarly, the neutrality approach could invalidate statutes
which do not undermine establishment clause values. A statute
which is not "neutral" may nevertheless be constitutional if it
does not have the effect of advancing a particular set of religious
beliefs. For example, a statute which has the purpose of ensuring
that a particular religious sect is treated equally with other religious sects would not be "neutral," but it would be constitutional
if its effect is to redress otherwise unequal treatment. The mere
terms of the statute itself, without any determination of its effects,
63. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (Court upheld portion of
statute that provided for textbook loans because books loaned were limited to
those that would be acceptable for use in public schools).
64. See Kurland, supra note 8. Kurland argues that the establishment clause
and the free exercise clause must be read together to mean that religion may not
be used as a basis of classification for purposes of governmental action, whether
that action be the conferring of rights or the imposition of duties. Id. at 5.
65. See Choper, supra note 8, at 688-90.
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should not always control the result. 66
Looking for some inherent nexus between the terms of an aid
statute and an effect on beliefs concerning religion should go a
long way toward removing the arbitrariness inherent in merely
identifying those who happen to take advantage of the aid made
available by the statute. By requiring that the prohibited effect be
inherent in the terms of the statute itself, the tendency to focus on
attenuated effects would at least be vastly reduced, if not eliminated. In other words, it would be more difficult for one person's
"effect" to be seen as a "noneffect" by another. Instead, the
question would be whether the effect really results from the nature of the statute itself.
C. A Postscript on the Entanglement Test
The excessive entanglement test has been the most heavily
criticized aspect of Lemon, and with good reason. 67 When one
reads the establishment clause cases which invalidate governmental aid on entanglement grounds, one is struck by the fact that the
reasoning used in applying the entanglement doctrine often reads
as if the Court were attempting to protect religious institutions
from the corrosive effect on their beliefs which governmental in66. The neutrality test could create a tension between the establishment
clause and the principle of accommodation under the free exercise clause. A
statute which seeks to accommodate certain religious practices could arguably
violate the establishment clause under the neutrality principle because the statute by its nature must make a distinction in its terms based on religious beliefs.
Yet, not to make the accommodation might arguably violate the free exercise
clause.
This tension need not exist. The establishment clause should not be read
automatically to invalidate any statute which mentions or refers to a religion or a
set of beliefs concerning religion. Otherwise, the drafters would merely have
written that "Congress shall make no law respecting religion." But the establishment clause does not say that "Congress shall make no law respecting religion."
Rather, it states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). Thus, a statute is not automatically unconstitutional merely because it mentions or deals with religion. To
be invalid, the statute must also tend to favor-or "establish"-one set of beliefs
over another.
The phrase "respecting an establishment of religion" indicates that government need not act as if religion does not exist. The phrase indicates the concept
that government should not prefer one set of beliefs concerning religion over
others. But neither should Congress unnecessarily penalize religious beliefs. A
religious distinction in a statute does not violate the establishment clause as long
as it does not have the effect of preferring certain beliefs concerning religion.
Adherents of a religious belief do not receive a preference from an effort by
government to accommodate their religious beliefs in order to avoid a clash with
free exercise clause values.
67. See generally Lines, supra note 4.
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terference would supposedly foster, rather than protecting
against a corrosive effect which entanglement would have on government, which is the thrust of the establishment clause, as opposed to the free exercise clause.
For example, in Aguilar v. Felton,68 Justice Brennan stated in
his opinion for the Court:
The principle that the state should not become too
closely entangled with the church in the administration
of assistance is rooted in two concerns. When the state
becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious
belief of those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely secular. In addition,
the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by
69
the governmental intrusion into sacred matters.
The latter concern-that governmental intrusion into sacred matters limits the freedom of religion of those affected by the governmental intrusion-is really the concern at which the free exercise
70
clause is directed. It is not an establishment clause concern.
As to the former concern-that entanglement between the
state and a particular religious sect somehow limits the freedom
of religious belief of those who are not members of the favored
sect-that is just not so. Administrative supervision of those who
receive aid under a statute does not limit the freedom of those
who choose not to seek or receive aid under the statute. Such
68. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
69. Id. at 409-10 (emphasis added).
70. Under the tests presently used by the Court, a tension between the free
exercise clause and the establishment clause exists. However, the tension need
not-in fact, it should not-exist. The two clauses are not contradictory to or
inconsistent with each other, but rather were meant to be mutually supportive of
each other. The two clauses are merely different sides of the same coin. Thus,
doctrines underlying both religion clauses should be consistent with each other.
That does not mean that the tests should be-or even can be-identical. Since
they are directed at different aspects of the same problem, a different perspective and, therefore, different rules are appropriate in the case of each clause.
Although it is not the subject of this article, I believe that if the tests that are
relevant to free exercise concerns and cases are applied only to free exercise
cases, while the tests developed to address the concerns involved in the establishment clause context are confined to cases raising establishment clause concerns, the alleged tension between the two clauses will largely disappear. See
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1378-88
(1981) (arguing that an obstacle to coherent analysis of the religion clauses is
the frequent failure to distinguish between them).
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individuals remain free, without limit, to hold or express other
beliefs, unless government somehow affirmatively restricts or limits their conduct or the expression of their beliefs. It is only when
government excludes those who hold certain views from receiving
aid or imposes restrictions on those who do not hold the favored
view that the freedom of religious belief of non-adherents is affected. Then there is afree exercise clause violation, not an establishment clause violation.
This is not to say that government should be permitted to
endorse or express a preference for one particular set of religious
beliefs as opposed to other religious beliefs, as long as non-adherents are not restricted or penalized in any way. Government
endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint runs afoul of the
establishment clause. However, it does so not because of its effects or because it limits the religious freedom of non-adherents
of the endorsed view. Rather, governmental endorsement of a
particular religious viewpoint is unconstitutional independently
under the establishment clause because of the lack of a proper
secular legislative purpose. Governmental endorsement would be
unconstitutional even if there were no free exercise clause because it is proscribed by the establishment clause. Moreover,
such endorsement is unconstitutional under the establishment
clause even if it has no prohibited effect.
At the heart of the excessive entanglement test is the desire
to protect beliefs concerning religion from governmental interference. That is the purpose of the free exercise clause. On the
other hand, the establishment clause is meant to protect against
government being dominated by a particular religious sect. If
one were to view any entanglement between church and state as
violative of the establishment clause, then there could no longer
be any role for religion to play in the life of a nation. 7 1 Some
entanglement is inevitable. 72 This problem is not solved by
prohibiting only "excessive" entanglement. That only leads to
the same arbitrariness and uncertainty now found in the cases.
Just as one justice may find a "primary effect" where anotherJustice fails to find such an effect, so too one Justice may view a certain degree of entanglement as "excessive" while another may
not view the same degree of entanglement as "excessive." Such
71. Alternatively, governmental regulations could never be applied to a
religious institution, thereby putting such institutions completely above the law.
72. See Beschle, supra note 8, at 171-72 ("[T]he ... separation... intended
by the framers . . . is quite simply impossible in the twentieth century.").
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concepts inherently lead to inconsistent and uncertain results.
Instead, it is only when entanglement results in governmental action which actually limits or restricts the activities or the expression of beliefs of those who hold particular beliefs concerning
religion that it becomes impermissible, and then it is impermissible as a restriction on thefree exercise of religion, not as an "establishment" of religion.
In short, it is a mistake to import free exercise concerns and
free exercise doctrines into the establishment clause context. The
analytical confusion is largely the result of a failure on the part of
the Court to separate the two clauses and the concerns each
73
addresses.
The lesson is clear. The excessive entanglement test should
be discarded as a test of constitutionality under the establishment
clause. If that doctrine has any role to play, it should be applied
only in the case of challenges to governmental action under the
free exercise clause.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Court's present approach in the area of governmental
aid to nonpublic education produces arbitrary and inconsistent
results. One way to eliminate the confusion may be to reject the
present framework of analysis and abandon both the primary effect test and the excessive entanglement test in favor of a new
analysis.
However, the Lemon tests have so far withstood widespread
criticism. This suggests that perhaps a modification of present
doctrine, rather than a radical departure from it, may be all that is
needed to correct the unpredictability of and the dissatisfaction
with present doctrine.
73. The primary effect test requires that an aid statute "must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added).
The Court does not typically invalidate statutes granting governmental aid to
nonpublic schools on the ground that such aid inhibits religion. The concept of
examining statutes to see whether they "inhibit" religion is more properly conducted in the context of a challenge to a statute under the free exercise clause,
rather than under the establishment clause. The use of the "inhibit" language in
Lemon is another example of the confusion caused by failing to separate free
exercise clause concerns from establishment clause concerns and thereby importing free exercise clause concepts into establishment clause cases. See Laycock, supra note 70, at 1380-82. This can only create confused thinking and lead
to improper results. Each type of case should be analyzed separately, under its
own tests, and without regard to the tests which are appropriate to enforce the
other clause, although the tests adopted under each clause should be consistent
with each other.
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Since the present arbitrariness and uncertainty appear to result from an analysis which divorces the search for effects from
the terms of the statute itself, the basic problem may be solved by
joining together both of these facets of the analysis. In particular,
the Court could introduce greater stability and predictability in its
decisions and still preserve the values which the establishment
clause is meant to protect by invalidating aid programs to nonpublic education only when there is a necessary and inherent
causal nexus between the specific terms of the particular statute
and the advancement of religion. In the absence of this nexus,
the statute is not a "law respecting an establishment of religion"
and therefore should be upheld.
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